Can two wrongs make it right? Reconsidering minimum resale price maintenance in the light of Allianz Hungaria

Summary, in English

Minimum resale price maintenance (RPM) agreements constitute hard-core vertical restraints and are treated as object restrictions in EU competition law. This article suggests that the time may have come where this approach is revised. After, first, discussing the economic theory behind RPM and the EU court's approach to object restrictions, it argues that the recent widening of the object analysis and the concomitant blurring of the object and effect categories may aid EU competition law to reconceptualise the approach to minimum RPM.

• Författare: Maria Ioannidou; Julian Nowag
• Avdelning/ar: EU-rätt; Juridiska institutionen
• Publiceringsår: 2015
• Språk: Engelska
• Sidor: 340-366
• Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie: European Competition Journal
• Volym: 11
• Issue: 2/3
• Länkar: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2015.1080044
• Dokumenttyp: Artikel i tidskrift
• Förlag: Taylor & Francis
• Ämne: Law
• Nyckelord: Per se illegality; RPM; minimum RPM; object and effect distinction; effects-analysis; cartels; anti-competitive object; anti-competitive effect; object restrictions; competition law; private law; Konkurrensrätt; avtal om prisbindning; effektanalys; karteller; civilrätt
• Aktiv: Published
• Forskningsgrupp: EU Law
• ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt: ISSN: 1744-1056